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 New York State officials are not legally authorized to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples,1 and those individuals who are authorized to perform marriage 
ceremonies in New York State are not allowed to perform such ceremonies for couples 
who have not obtained a validly issued license.2 Yet same-sex couples who legally 
marry outside of New York State and then return to reside within the state are 
entitled to legal recognition of their marriages, according to various state executive 
officials and a growing number of New York State courts.3 New York State has 
adopted a handful of statutes of limited application recognizing domestic 
partnerships,4 but has not adopted a general statute providing for domestic 
partnerships or civil unions for same-sex partners.5 The result of these developments 
1. Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 357 (2006) (holding New York Domestic Relations Law does not 
authorize issuance of licenses for marriages of same-sex partners, although statute does not, on its face, 
expressly forbid such marriages).
2. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 13 (McKinney 1999).
3. See Lewis v. N.Y. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578 (3d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d on other grounds sub nom, 
Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358 (2009); Godfrey v. Spano, 871 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2d Dep’t 2008), aff ’d on 
other grounds, 13 N.Y.3d 358 (2009); Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (4th Dep’t 
2008), appeal dismissed, 10 N.Y.3d 856 (2008). In Martinez, the court held that established New York 
marriage-recognition principles dictate recognizing a same-sex marriage performed in Canada. Lewis 
and Godfrey were challenges to executive actions recognizing same-sex marriages performed outside the 
state. In both cases, the Appellate Division panels rejected the challenges based on New York marriage-
recognition principles, and in both cases the Court of Appeals affirmed the rejection of the challenges 
on other grounds without deciding whether New York marriage-recognition principles would apply to 
these marriages. Godfrey, 13 N.Y.3d at 377; see also Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 
Bronx County 2008) (rejecting challenge to memorandum sent by governor’s legal counsel to agency 
heads advising of the Martinez decision and requiring reports back on steps being taken to avoid liability 
for refusing to recognize same-sex marriages).
4. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2805-q (McKinney 2007) (hospital visitation by domestic partners); N.Y. 
Pub. Health Law § 4201 (McKinney 2002) (rights of surviving domestic partners with respect to 
disposition of remains); N.Y. Workers’ Comp. Law § 4 (McKinney 2005) (authorizing benefits for 
surviving domestic partners of employees killed during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
5. “Domestic partnerships” and “civil unions” are legal structures enacted in various jurisdictions to provide 
a legal structure other than marriage for emotionally committed couples. “Domestic partnerships” 
originally emerged in the private sector, sometimes as the result of collective bargaining and sometimes 
through voluntary employer action, to recognize the family relationships of cohabiting same-sex couples 
(and sometimes also unmarried different-sex couples) for purposes of employee benefit programs. From 
the mid-1980s onward, many municipalities adopted domestic partnership ordinances, conferring 
various local law rights that are enjoyed by married couples on unmarried partners who registered their 
relationships with the municipality. In three states—California, Oregon, and Washington—domestic 
partnership statutes have been adopted that confer upon registered same-sex domestic partners almost 
all of the legal rights and responsibilities under state law that are conferred upon married couples. See 
Cal. Fam. Code. § 297.5 (West 2004); Oregon Family Fairness Act, § 9, Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.990, 
Anno. & Ref. (2009); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.60.015 cmt. 521, § 1 (West 2009). “Civil unions” 
are, by contrast, virtual state law marriages for same-sex couples. The first civil union statute was 
enacted in 2000 by Vermont in response to an order to the legislature from the state’s supreme court to 
cure a violation of the state constitution’s Equal Benefits Clause that arose from the denial of marriage 
to same-sex partners. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Neighboring states of New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, and New Jersey have enacted similar statutes; New Hampshire entirely 
voluntarily, Connecticut in the face of a pending lawsuit seeking same-sex marriages that was ultimately 
successful, see Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008), and New Jersey in 
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is an oddly unsettled legal landscape for same-sex couples in New York State as of 
January 2010, in which same-sex marriage cannot be contracted within the state, but 
same-sex marriage is freely available to those willing to go outside the state or outside 
the country to obtain it.6
i.  histOriCaL baCKgrOUnd: thE Hernandez dECisiOn and aVaiLabiLitY Of 
MarriagEs ELsEWhErE
 Several lawsuits initiated during 2004 seeking marriage licenses for same-sex 
partners were consolidated for decision by the New York Court of Appeals, which 
issued its ruling in Hernandez v. Robles on July 6, 2006.7 The court held that the 
New York Domestic Relations Law8 did not authorize marriage licenses for same-sex 
couples, and that this feature of the law did not violate the New York State 
Constitution.9 At the same time, the plurality observed that the legislature could 
response to a state supreme court decision similar to the Vermont ruling. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 
196 (N.J. 2006). The Connecticut Supreme Court explained in detail in Kerrigan that civil unions are 
distinct from, and inferior to, marriage because they impart only legal rights and responsibilities but 
lack the broader social meanings attached by society to the concept of marriage. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 
at 417–18. Additionally, of course, because of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, couples that have 
domestic partnerships or civil unions are denied the numerous rights and benefits available to married 
couples under federal law, and have been held to lack standing to sue the federal government for denial 
of those benefits. See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006) (same-sex domestic 
partners lack standing to challenge denial of federal rights under Defense of Marriage Act).
6. This presents an eerie counterpart to the situation of non-religious Jews in Israel who wish to marry 
without the involvement of the Orthodox Jewish rabbinate. As civil marriage is not available within the 
country, such couples customarily travel outside of the country to marry, and then return to live in 
Israel, where civil marriages contracted elsewhere—even among Israeli citizens—are freely recognized. 
Indeed, the High Court of Israel has even gone so far as to order the civil authorities to issue new 
identity documents identifying some same-sex couples who were wed in Canada as “married.” See HCJ 
3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Dir. of the Population Admin. in the Ministry of the Interior [2006] (unpublished).
7. 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006).
8. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 2, 3, 5, 12, 15(1)(a) & 50 (McKinney 1999). The Hernandez court explained:
Articles 2 and 3 of the Domestic Relations Law, which govern marriage, nowhere say in so 
many words that only people of different sexes may marry each other, but that was the 
universal understanding when articles 2 and 3 were adopted in 1909, an understanding 
ref lected in several statutes. Domestic Relations Law § 12 provides that “the parties must 
solemnly declare . . . that they take each other as husband and wife.” Domestic Relations 
Law § 15 (1) (a) requires town and city clerks to obtain specified information from “the 
groom” and “the bride.” Domestic Relations Law § 5 prohibits certain marriages as 
incestuous, specifying opposite-sex combinations (brother and sister, uncle and niece, 
aunt and nephew), but not same-sex combinations. Domestic Relations Law § 50 says 
that the property of “a married woman . . . shall not be subject to her husband’s 
control.”
 Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 357.
9. One member of the court recused himself from the case. See Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d at 355. Three members 
signed a plurality opinion, one of which and one other signed a concurring opinion, and two dissented. 
See id. Thus, there is no single opinion for the court, although the combination of plurality and 
concurrence rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that same-sex couples enjoy a right guaranteed by the 
New York State Constitution to marry on the same basis as different-sex couples. See id. at 356, 379.
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change the law to allow such marriages,10 but said nothing about whether same-sex 
marriages validly performed in other jurisdictions were entitled to recognition in 
New York.
 At the time the Court of Appeals spoke, only one other state—Massachusetts—
was issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and the question whether same-sex 
couples whose primary residence was outside of Massachusetts were entitled to 
receive marriage licenses in that state was being litigated. Shortly after the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health in 2003 that same-sex couples in Massachusetts were entitled to marry 
pursuant to the Equal Benefits Provision of the Massachusetts Constitution,11 state 
officials determined that a little-known statute dating from 1913, which prohibited 
the issuance of marriage licenses to non-residents whose home states would not allow 
the marriages, could be used to deny marriage licenses to non-resident same-sex 
couples who could not marry in their home states, even though there was no residency 
requirement to obtain a marriage license in Massachusetts.12 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court subsequently rejected a constitutional challenge to that old 
statute in Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health, but concluded that the statute 
should be construed to bar issuance of licenses only to residents of states that 
affirmatively prohibited same-sex marriages as a matter of positive declaration 
through their constitutions, statutes, or judicial opinions.13 The Cote-Whitacre 
decision was announced on March 30, 2006.14 The Hernandez decision was issued 
on July 6, 2006, while a Massachusetts trial judge was contemplating on remand in 
Cote-Whitacre whether a same-sex couple from New York (who were among the 
plaintiffs in that case) could obtain a marriage license in Massachusetts.15 That court 
concluded, in a decision announced on September 29, 2006, that the Hernandez 
decision answered the question by providing an affirmative declaration that same-
10. See id. at 366.
11. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
12. Mass. Gen Laws ch. 207, § 11 (repealed 2008). The statute had been passed at a time when most states 
forbade mixed-race marriages, but Massachusetts allowed them. It was based on a model statute 
proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, primarily intended to prevent the availability 
of marriages for mixed-race couples in states like Massachusetts from being used as a device to evade the 
prohibition on mixed-race marriages in other states. This aspect of the law became moot in 1967 with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, which held laws against mixed-race marriages 
unconstitutional. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. 844 N.E.2d 623, 638 (Mass. 2006). The court stated:
 [T]he statute broadly precludes the issuance of a marriage license in Massachusetts 
where the proposed marriage would be in violation of the laws of the domicil [sic] State, 
either because it is expressly deemed “void,” or because it is prohibited by constitutional 
amendment, by the common law, or by State statutory language to the effect that such 
marriage is not permitted, not recognized, not valid, or the like.
 Id.
14. Id. at 623.
15. See Cole-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 04-2656, 2006 WL 3208758 (Mass. Super. Sept. 29, 
2006).
483
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
sex marriages were not authorized under New York law, and held that same-sex 
couples from New York could not obtain marriage licenses in Massachusetts.16
 In addition to Massachusetts, there were a handful of foreign jurisdictions that 
allowed same-sex couples to marry at the time of the Hernandez decision, including 
Canada,17 (which shares a border with New York), the Netherlands,18 Spain,19 and 
Belgium;20 subsequently, South Africa21 and Norway22 joined that list. The most 
significant of these for purposes of this article is Canada, due to its close geographical 
proximity to New York and its lack of a residency requirement for issuing licenses 
and performing marriage ceremonies. As some of the cases discussed below indicate, 
same-sex couples from New York did take advantage of these factors to marry in 
Canada. In addition, at the time of the Hernandez decision, some other states had 
already provided a legal status other than marriage for same sex couples. In Hawaii, 
reciprocal beneficiaries were afforded a short list of state law rights.23 In Vermont,24 
California,25 and New Jersey,26 same-sex couples could enter into civil unions or 
domestic partnerships that provided almost all of the state law rights that married 
couples enjoyed in those jurisdictions.
ii. nEW YOrK trEatMEnt Of saME-sEX UniOns COntraCtEd ELsEWhErE
 In Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, a case that was making its way through the 
courts while Hernandez was pending, a surviving Vermont civil union partner who 
had resided with his partner in New York State was attempting to assert a wrongful 
death claim against the hospital where his partner had died after a surgical procedure, 
claiming that he should be entitled to sue as a spouse, as he would be able to do had 
16. See id. at *2–3.
17. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33, § 4 (Can.).
18. See Associated Press, Dutch Legislators Approve Full Marriage Rights for Gays, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 
2000, at A4.
19. See Renwick McLean, Spanish Parliament Gives Approval to Bill to Legalize Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 22, 2005, at A12.
20. Marlise Simons, World Briefing Europe: Belgium: Parliament Approves Gay Marriages, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
31, 2003, at A6.
21. See Sharon LaFraniere, South African Parliament Approves Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 
2006, at A12.
22. See Associated Press, Norway: Same Sex Marriage Permitted, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2008, at A11.
23. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572C (2006). Reciprocal beneficiaries were same-sex couples or elderly unmarried 
different-sex couples who were accorded a small list of state law rights similar to those provided married 
couples. See id. §§ 572C-3, 572C-4.
24. See 15 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201, 1204 (2002). Vermont civil union partners enjoy virtually all the 
state law rights and benefits that are accorded to married couples in that state.
25. Cal. Fam. Code §§ 297, 297.5 (West 2004). California domestic partners enjoy virtually all the state 
law rights and benefits that are accorded to married couples in that state.
26. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:8A (West 2007). New Jersey civil union partners enjoy virtually all the state law 
rights and benefits that are accorded to married couples in that state.
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his partner died in a Vermont hospital.27 Although the trial judge found that the 
plaintiff ’s Vermont civil union should be recognized in this circumstance as creating 
a spousal relationship for purposes of the New York Wrongful Death Act,28 the 
Appellate Division, ruling after the Hernandez decision, rejected this conclusion, 
finding that comity principles did not require recognizing the civil union for purposes 
of New York law.29 To date, no appellate court in New York has granted formal 
recognition to a Vermont civil union, or any other alternative legal status, such as a 
civil union or a domestic partnership, contracted in another state.30
 After the Hernandez ruling, the number of jurisdictions providing legal 
recognition in some form to same-sex partners increased, with Connecticut,31 New 
Hampshire,32 New Jersey,33 Washington State,34 and Oregon35 joining the lists with 
an alternative status of civil unions or domestic partnerships, and with Connecticut 
proceeding to full marriage rights by order of its Supreme Court on October 28, 
2008.36 The California Supreme Court also opened up marriage to same-sex couples 
in a ruling issued on May 14, 2008,37 but on November 4, 2008, California voters 
approved Proposition 8, overruling the court by adding an exclusively different-sex 
definition of marriage to the California Constitution.38 During the summer of 2008, 
27. 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dep’t 2005), appeal dismissed, 6 N.Y.3d 890 (2006).
28. See Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2003).
29. See Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476. 
30. While falling short of actual recognition of a Vermont civil union having legal effect in New York, a 
trial judge ruled in Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6367 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County Oct. 2, 2008), that evidence that a lesbian couple had entered into a Vermont civil union would 
strengthen the case of one of the partners who was seeking joint custody and visitation rights with their 
child, borne by the other partner, after the break-up of their relationship. The court stated that “the 
parties’ civil union at the time of [the child’s] birth, is a significant, though not necessarily a 
determinative, factor in petitioner’s estoppel argument,” and found that “the civil union here is strong 
evidence of the parties’ intention to create familial bonds for their and [the child’s] benefit.” Id. at *26–
27. Debra H. was subsequently reversed, 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1st Dep’t 2009), but the Court of Appeals 
has granted leave to appeal. 13 N.Y.3d 702 (2009).
31. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-38bb (West 2009), repealed by 2009 Conn. Pub. Acts 13 (effective 
Oct. 1, 2010).
32. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457-A:2 (LexisNexis 2009), repealed by 2009 N.H. Laws 59 (effective Jan. 
1, 2011).
33. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:1-30 (West Supp. 2009).
34. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.60.030 (West Supp. 2009).
35. 2007 Or. Laws ch.99, § 3(1).
36. See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407.
37. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
38. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”) Challenges were filed to the validity of the enactment of this Amendment. The California 
Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 5, 2009, with a decision constitutionally mandated to be 
issued within ninety days of the argument. The court agreed to consider not only constitutional 
challenges to Proposition 8, but also whether same-sex marriages performed prior to its enactment 
would remain valid, in the event that the court decided to reject the constitutional challenges. On May 
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Massachusetts repealed its old statute that had served to bar almost all non-resident 
same-sex couples from obtaining licenses there.39 After the Massachusetts repeal, 
none of the other U.S. jurisdictions allowing same-sex marriages had residency 
requirements for those seeking licenses, so at various times during 2008, same-sex 
couples residing in New York could marry in California, Massachusetts, and 
Connecticut (and, of course, Canada) and return to live in New York as married 
couples if governmental and non-governmental actors in New York would recognize 
their marriages.
 Some New York couples, impatient with the slow progress of the legislature in 
approving a law to open up marriage to same-sex couples, went out of state to marry. 
It was therefore inevitable that New York State government officials and courts 
would confront the question whether those marriages would be recognized in the 
state. Responding to requests for advice about same-sex marriage from various 
municipalities, the New York Attorney General’s Office issued an informal letter 
opinion in March 2004, stating that although existing New York marriage statutes 
could not be construed to allow same-sex marriages, the established principles of the 
New York marriage-recognition doctrine would support recognizing such marriages 
lawfully performed elsewhere,40 and various other officials—such as the Westchester 
County Executive, the State Comptroller, and the Civil Service Department—
eventually came to the same conclusion.41 However, the first courts to confront the 
issue balked, citing Hernandez as establishing a state policy against recognizing 
same-sex marriages.42
iii. thE Martinez dECisiOn and its JUdiCiaL aftErMath
 Despite these earlier trial court decisions, on February 1, 2008, in the first 
appellate ruling on the subject, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, found 
that nothing in Hernandez would preclude recognition of same-sex marriages, and 
that principles of comity, as developed by the New York courts in marriage-recognition 
26, 2009, the California Supreme Court rejected the constitutional challenges to Proposition 8 and held 
that Proposition 8 “lawfully amend[ed] the California Constitution.” Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 
63–64 (Cal. 2009). However, the California Supreme Court held, in the same decision, that any same-
sex marriages performed before the effective date of Proposition 8 are valid and “must continue to be 
recognized in [California].” Id. at 64.
39. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 11 (2007), repealed by 2008 Mass. Acts ch. 216, § 1 (effective Aug. 1, 
2008).
40. See Marc Santora, Spitzer’s Opinion Mixed on Status of Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1.
41. In each case, their decisions were challenged in taxpayer litigation backed by the Alliance Defense 
Fund, resulting in court decisions rejecting the challenges. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. Funderburke v. N.Y. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 822 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2006), vacated as 
moot, 854 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep’t 2008); Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
2006). Courts that cited Hernandez for this proposition did not provide any reasoned explanation or 
nuanced analysis of the Hernandez decision to reach their conclusions, but merely asserted that 
recognizing such marriages would be contrary to the public policy against same-sex marriage announced 
in Hernandez.
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cases, compelled recognition of a marriage contracted in Canada by a same-sex 
couple residing in New York.43 In that case, Martinez v. County of Monroe, an 
employee of a community college and her same-sex partner who had married in 
Ontario, Canada in July 2004, asserted that the college must treat the employee’s 
same-sex spouse the same as any other legal spouse for purposes of the college’s 
healthcare plan.44 The college’s refusal was sustained by the Monroe County Supreme 
Court, but the Appellate Division reversed, rejecting the contention that Hernandez 
required denying recognition to the marriage.45
 The Appellate Division explained that New York marriage-recognition law, 
dating back “for well over a century . . . recognized marriages solemnized outside 
New York unless they f[e]ll into two categories of exception: (1) marriage, the 
recognition of which is prohibited by the ‘positive law’ of New York and (2) marriages 
involving incest or polygamy, both of which fall within the prohibitions of ‘natural 
law.’”46 Thus, New York followed the general rule of comity in marriage-recognition 
cases. The Appellate Division found that neither exception applied to this case.47 
Unlike most other states,48 New York has never enacted a statute expressly forbidding 
43. See Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740.
44. See id. at 741–42.
45. Id. at 741, 743.
46. Id. at 742 (citations omitted).
47. See id. at 742–43.
48. States that have adopted legislation and/or a constitutional amendment effectively prohibiting same-sex 
marriages include, as of January 2010:
 Ala.: Ala. Const. art. 1, § 36.03; Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (Lexis Nexis 2009 ). Alaska: Alaska Const. 
art. I, § 25; Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013 (2008). Ariz.: Ariz. Const. art. XXX, § 1; Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 25-101(c), 25-112 (2007). Ark.: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-11-107, 9-11-208 (2008 & Supp. 2009). 
Cal.: Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5; Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (West 2004). Colo.: Colo. Const. art. II, § 31; 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-104 (2008). Fla.: Fla. Const. art. I, § 27; Fla. Stat. Ann §§ 741.04(1), 741.212 
(West 2005). Ga.: Ga. Const. art. I, § IV; Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-3.1 (2004). Haw.: Haw. Const. art. I, 
§ 23; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (2006). Idaho: Idaho Const. art. III, § 28; Idaho Code Ann. § 32-209 
(2006). Ill.: 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/201, 5/212(5), 5/213.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009). Ind.: Ind. 
Code Ann. § 31-11-1-1 (West 2003). Kan.: Kan. Const. art. 15, § 16; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-101(a), 
23-115 (2007). Ky: Ky. Const. § 233a; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 402.005, 402.020(1)(d), 402.040(2), 
402.045 (West 1999). La.: La. Const. art. XII, § 15; La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 89 (Supp. 2009); La. 
Civ. Code Ann. art. 3520 (Supp. 2009). Md.: Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2006). 
Mich.: Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. §§ 551.1, 551.271(2) (Lexis Nexis 2007). 
Minn.: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 517.01, 517.03 (2006). Miss.: Miss. Const. art. XIV, § 263A; Miss. 
Code Ann. § 93-1-1(2), (West 2004). Mo.: Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 451.022 (West 
2003). Mont.: Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7; Mont. Code Ann. § 40-1-401, (2009). Neb.: Neb. Const. 
art. I, § 29. Nev.: Nev. Const. art I, § 21. N.C.: N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §51-1.2 (LexisNexis 2007). 
N.D.: N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-03-01, 14-03-08, (2004). Ohio: Ohio 
Const. art. XV, § 11; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01 (LexisNexis 2008). Okla.: Okla. Const. art. II, 
§ 35; Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West 2001). Pa.: 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1102, 1704 (West 2001). S.C.: 
S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15 (2008). S.D.: S.D. Const. art. XXI, § 9; S.D. 
Codified Laws §§ 25-1-1, 25-1-38, (1999). Tenn.: Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 8; Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113 
(West 2005). Tex.: Tex. Const. art. I, § 32; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 2.001, 6.204 (Vernon 2006). 
Utah: Utah Const. art. I, § 29; Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4.1, (West 2007). Va.: Va. Const. 
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the recognition of marriages of same-sex couples contracted in other states, and the 
Appellate Division did not consider a marriage between two persons of the same-sex 
to be a violation of natural law in the sense conveyed by the historic exception for 
incestuous or polygamous marriages.49
 Rejecting Monroe County’s argument that the Hernandez case satisfied the first 
exception by construing the Domestic Relations Law to prohibit the issuance of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the Appellate Division asserted that Hernandez 
“does not articulate the public policy for which it is cited by defendants, but instead 
holds merely that the New York State Constitution does not compel recognition of 
same-sex marriages solemnized in New York.”50 Furthermore, the Hernandez ruling 
had observed that the legislature was free to change this result, which, according to 
the Appellate Division, meant that the Court of Appeals would hold that recognition 
of a same-sex marriage would not violate the public policy of the state.51
 Furthermore, the Appellate Division opined, under New York’s Human Rights 
Law,52 the college was prohibited from discriminating against an employee “in 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” due to the 
employee’s sexual orientation.53 By distinguishing between legally valid same-sex 
and opposite-sex marriages in providing health benefits, the college was engaging in 
such discrimination.54 The Appellate Division remanded the case to the trial court 
for determination of a remedy and entry of a final order.55
art. I, § 15-A ; Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-45.2, 20-45.3, (West 2008). Wash.: Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.020 
(West 2005). W. Va.: W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 48-2-104, 48-2-603 (West 2004). Wis.: Wis. Const. art. 
XIII, § 13; Wis. Stat. §§ 765.001, 765.01, (2009). Wyo.: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 (2009).
49. Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 742–43. Unfortunately, the court states its conclusion as to this point without 
any detailed discussion, which would have been useful in light of the religious objections that have been 
articulated against same-sex marriages. In the eyes of some religious adherents, marriage is a sacred 
institution designed by the Deity for purposes of biological reproduction of humanity, and thus a 
proposal that two persons of the same sex, who cannot procreate through sexual intercourse, can be 
married is “unnatural.” Perhaps the court did not mention that argument because it was implicitly 
deemed irrelevant in the civil marriage context, and giving it any weight would seem contrary to the 
separation of church and state that is deemed an essential element of our governmental plan.
50. Id. at 743.
51. See id.
52. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 2005).
53. Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 743 (citation omitted).
54. See id. Were the college a private-sector entity, its employee benefits plan would not be subject to the 
State Human Rights Law due to preemption under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). However, the state may regulate employee benefit plans 
offered by non-federal public sector employers in the state. Id. § 1003(b)(1) (providing that ERISA does 
not apply to “governmental” plans).
55. The remedy would be purely monetary. By the time the case came to decision by the Appellate Division, 
the college had altered its policy to extend benefits to domestic partners and the appellant’s spouse was 
receiving coverage under the college’s health benefits plan. See Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 743–44. The 
court rejected the defendant’s suggestion that this mooted the case, since a claim remained for the costs 
of providing insurance coverage between the time the appellant requested the benefit and the time the 
college changed its policy. See id.
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 Under New York practice, a ruling by a panel of the Appellate Division in any 
department becomes a precedent binding on all trial courts of the state unless or 
until another panel of the Appellate Division contradicts it.56 Therefore, the Martinez 
ruling immediately established a statewide precedent for the recognition of same-sex 
marriages contracted in other jurisdictions. The county attempted an immediate 
appeal to the Court of Appeals, but was rebuffed on grounds that a final order had 
not been issued in the case.57 Subsequently, the county abandoned its appeal.58
 Trial courts in other parts of the state, with one minor exception,59 accepted 
Martinez as a binding precedent and soon applied it in other cases involving couples 
who had married in Canada or Massachusetts. For example, in Beth R. v. Donna 
M.60 and C.M. v. C.C.,61 supreme court justices in New York County ruled that the 
court had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for divorce filed by same-sex spouses 
who were married in Canada and Massachusetts, respectively. Consistently, in In re 
Estate of Ranftle, a New York County Surrogate Court judge ruled that the surviving 
husband from a same-sex Canadian marriage was the decedent’s legal spouse and 
sole distributee for purposes of probating a will.62 And, in In re Donna S., a Monroe 
County Family Court judge found that there was no need for the same-sex legal 
spouse of a woman who was about to give birth through donor insemination to seek 
certification as a qualified adoptive parent, because she could be treated in the same 
way as the legal husband of a woman about to give birth under similar circumstances; 
56. See People v. Turner, 5 N.Y.3d 476, 482 (2005) (citing Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 476 
N.Y.S.2d 918, 919–20 (2d Dep’t 1984)).
57. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 10 N.Y.3d 856 (2008).
58. Gary Craig, County Ends Same-Sex Marriage Challenge, Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, Nov. 
22, 2008, at A1.
59. See Will of Zwerling, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5651 (Sur. Ct. Queens County Sept. 9, 2008). In Will of 
Zwerling, the court incorrectly stated that the lack of a ruling on the merits by the Appellate Division, 
Second Department, left doubt about whether a same-sex marriage performed in Canada was valid in 
Queens County. The court ruled that surviving parents of a decedent who had married his same-sex 
partner in Canada had to be joined as parties to the probate of a last will and testament. See id. The 
court erred, since controlling Second Department precedent provides that trial courts within the Second 
Department are bound by uncontradicted rulings of other departments of the Appellate Division. See 
Storms, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 919–20.
60. 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2008).
61. 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2008).
62. No. 4585-2008, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2488 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 26, 2009). Under section 
1403(1)(a) of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act, when a will is offered for probate, the distributees of 
the decedent must be served with process. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act § 1403(1)(a) (McKinney 1995). 
When the decedent was married at the time of death, his or her sole distributee is his or her legal 
spouse. See In re Ranftle, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2488 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2009). Surrogate Glen 
ruled that the decedent’s same-sex spouse from a Canadian marriage was his sole distributee. See id. 
Thus, if the decedent had died intestate, his surviving same-sex spouse would inherit the entire estate. 
See id. If, as in this case, the decedent died leaving a will, other family members who would have been 
considered distributees in the absence of a surviving spouse would have been entitled to notice of the 
probate proceeding so they could protect their interests. Because Surrogate Glen recognized the same-
sex marriage, no notice was required in this case to the surviving siblings of the decedent.
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execution of consent by both parties would be sufficient to establish the spouse’s 
legal rights as a parent.63
iV. thE EXECUtiVE branCh rEspOnsE tO thE Martinez dECisiOn
 The Martinez ruling set in motion executive branch action as well. Some elected 
officials with executive authority had previously announced that governmental bodies 
under their authority would recognize same-sex marriages contracted out of state,64 
but the new state-wide appellate judicial precedent spurred Governor David Paterson 
to action at the instance of his legal counsel, David Nocenti. Nocenti had drafted a 
memorandum that was sent to all executive agencies of the state during May 2008, 
alerting them to the Martinez ruling and observing that failure to recognize same-
sex marriages lawfully contracted elsewhere could subject the government to 
liability.65 The memorandum instructed the agencies to review their policies in light 
of the legal obligation to accord recognition to such marriages, and to report back to 
the governor’s office by the end of June on what steps they were taking to revise their 
procedures in conformance with the law.
 Shortly after the California Supreme Court put the same-sex marriage issue back 
in the headlines with its controversial ruling of May 15, 2008 by holding that denial 
of marriage rights to same-sex couples violated the constitution of the most populous 
state in the nation,66 news of the Nocenti memorandum leaked to the press, sparking 
outraged protest from some opponents of same-sex marriage and a lawsuit claiming 
that the governor had exceeded his authority by authorizing the letter to be sent. The 
lawsuit quickly provided vindication for Governor Paterson, as a trial court ruled 
that he had not exceeded his authority when he ordered executive branch agencies to 
comply with a state-wide legal precedent of the Appellate Division.67 This conclusion 
was consistent with rulings issued both earlier and subsequently, rejecting similar 
challenges that had been mounted to decisions by the State Comptroller, the Civil 
Service Department, and the Westchester County Executive: That government 
63. 871 N.Y.S.2d 883 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County 2009).
64. Former New York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi had announced this position, as had Westchester 
County Executive Andrew Spano, and the Civil Service Department had changed its position and 
settled the Funderburke lawsuit, which was brought by a retired public school teacher who had married 
his same-sex partner in Canada and sought coverage for his partner under the health insurance program 
for state government retirees administered by the Civil Service Department. See Godfrey, 871 N.Y.S.2d 
296; Funderburke v. State Dep’t of Civil Serv., 854 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep’t 2008); Michael Cooper, 
Hevesi Extends Pension Rights to Gay Spouses, N.Y Times, Oct. 14, 2004, at B1.
65. The memorandum, which was subsequently leaked to the press, was reproduced in full on various 
websites. This author located a copy on the website of a weekly newspaper, the New York Observer. See 
Azi Paybarah, Paterson’s Message on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. Observer, May 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.observer.com/2008/patersons-message-same-sex-marriage.
66. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
67. See Golden, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822. Taxpayer plaintiffs in this and the other lawsuits, see cases cited infra note 
68, were represented by attorneys affiliated with the Alliance Defense Fund, a legal advocacy organization 
opposed to same-sex marriage that vowed to appeal all of its cases to the Court of Appeals. See Joel 
Stashenko, Conservative Christian Group Targets New York, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 2009, at 1.
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entities and programs under their direction would recognize same-sex marriages 
lawfully contracted out of state.68 All of the trial judges in these cases agreed that 
government executives in New York State could, consistent with their authority and 
established principles of New York marriage-recognition law, decide to recognize 
same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other jurisdictions.
 The appellate seal of approval was put on this conclusion when a panel of the 
Appellate Division, Third Department rejected the challenge to the Civil Service 
Department’s decision to recognize foreign same-sex marriages for purposes of 
administering employee benefits programs for public employees in the state. The 
January 22, 2009 ruling in Lewis v. State Department of Civil Service decisively 
rejected the argument that the Civil Service Department had violated separation of 
powers or otherwise exceeded its discretionary authority by recognizing foreign 
same-sex marriages for these purposes.69 A majority of the five-judge panel relied 
broadly on the Fourth Department’s Martinez decision to declare that such marriages 
would be recognized under New York law, while two concurring judges rested their 
agreement more narrowly on the discretion of the Civil Service Department to 
construe its enabling statute consistently with the existing practice of extending 
benefits to domestic partners of public employees, under policies adopted 
administratively or negotiated with the public sector labor unions.70
 Meanwhile, as the litigation was progressing, various agencies of the state 
government responded to the Nocenti memorandum by reviewing and revising their 
policies. The first truly tangible example of this came with publication by the State 
Insurance Department of a “Circular Letter” to the insurance industry, providing 
that companies licensed to sell insurance in New York State should treat same-sex 
couples legally married in other jurisdictions as married for the purposes of New 
York insurance law.71 As of the beginning of 2009, other departments had not been 
heard from as formally, although the State Tax Department had sent informal 
68. Lewis v. N.Y. Dep’t of Civil Servs., No. 4078-07, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1623 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
County, Mar. 3, 2008), aff ’d, 872 N.Y.S.2d 578 (3d Dep’t 2009), aff ’d on other grounds sub nom, Godfrey 
v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358 (2009) (holding Civil Service Department’s decision to recognize foreign 
same-sex marriages for purposes of administration of state employee benefit programs is not subject to 
constitutional challenge); Godfrey, 871 N.Y.S.2d 296 (holding Westchester County Executive’s order 
that county agencies afford recognition to same-sex marriages to the extent consistent with the law is 
not subject to constitutional challenge); Godfrey v. Hevesi, No. 5896-06, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6589 
(Sup. Ct. Albany County Sept. 5, 2007) (holding State Comptroller’s decision to recognize foreign 
same-sex marriages for purposes of administering state employee retirement program is not subject to 
constitutional challenge).
69. See Lewis, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
70. See id. at 584, 586. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, but a majority of the court rested the 
affirmance on the reasoning of the concurrence in the Appellate Division and expressly refrained from 
opining as to the rationale used by the majority of the Appellate Division panel. See Godfrey, 13 N.Y.3d 
at 377. The concurring judges in the Court of Appeals stated that they would have decided the marriage-
recognition issue in favor of the defendants based on New York marriage-recognition principles. Id. 
(Ciparick, J., concurring).
71. State of N.Y. Ins. Dep’t, Circular Letter No. 27 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/
circltr/2008/cl08_27.htm.
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responses to inquiries, indicating that it was still studying how to reconcile the 
requirements of state and federal tax law with the new marriage-recognition regime.
V. intO thE fUtUrE
 Although neither the Court of Appeals—the state’s highest court—nor the 
legislature had yet spoken directly on the issue at the beginning of 2010, the 
accumulating body of case law and executive action had created a momentum for the 
legal recognition of foreign same-sex marriages in New York that appeared to be 
well-grounded in existing precedent. The established principles of marriage 
recognition under New York law had long facilitated the easy movement of residents 
across state lines without having to worry about whether their marital status would 
be recognized in other jurisdictions—although the recent marriage-recognition cases 
appeared to create a startling anomaly between the kind of marriages that could be 
contracted within the state and those that might be obtained only outside it.
 The decision by the Court of Appeals on November 19, 2009 to affirm two 
Appellate Division marriage-recognition rulings on other grounds, while expressly 
refraining from opining on marriage recognition, did not necessarily place this trend 
in question. For one thing, the court did not question the recognition analysis that 
the lower courts had articulated.72 For another, New York courts have followed the 
practice of continuing to treat the rationale of Appellate Division decisions as 
precedential even when they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals on other grounds.73 
Thus, as 2010 began, those of the Appellate Divisions that had expressed a view 
agreed that established New York marriage-recognition principles require recognition 
of same-sex marriages lawfully contracted out of state.
 The Court of Appeals majority in Godfrey v. Spano expressed its “hope that the 
Legislature will address this controversy.”74 Passage of pending marriage equality 
legislation would have done so, but the measure approved earlier in 2009 by the 
Assembly75 was rejected by the State Senate on December 2, 2009 by a vote of 
twenty-eight to thirty-four,76 a margin sufficiently decisive to suggest that the 
legislature would not take up this issue until after the next round of elections. 
72. The court stated: “Because we can decide the cases before us on narrower grounds, we find it unnecessary 
to reach defendants’ argument that New York’s common law marriage-recognition rule is a proper basis 
for the challenged recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages.” Godfrey, 13 N.Y.3d at 377.
73. See, e.g., People v. Serrano, 7 N.Y.3d 730 (2006) (citing People v. Camacho, 646 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep’t 
1996), aff ’d on other grounds, 90 N.Y.2d 558 (1997), as authority on the point the court had avoided 
determining in its prior affirmance).
74. 13 N.Y.3d at 377.
75. See Nicholas Confessore, Personal Victory for Assemblyman on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, June 25, 2007, 
at B5; Jeremy W. Peters, Paterson Vows Personal Support to Pass Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y Times, Apr. 
17, 2009, at A1; Jeremy W. Peters, Assembly Passes Gay Marriage Bill; Senate Fight Awaits, N.Y Times, 
May 13, 2009, at A24.
76. See Jeremy W. Peters, New York Senate Turns Back Bill on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2009, at 
A1.
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 New York legislators’ failure to address the issue of marriage recognition in the 
face of judicial and executive developments recounted above says more about the 
continual dysfunction of the state legislative process in New York than it does about 
the substantive issue. The controlling Democratic majority in the Assembly—which 
passed same-sex marriage bills in 2007 and 2009—apparently assures that New York 
will not enact a statutory or constitutional ban on same-sex marriages, and Democratic 
control of the Senate, however tenuously maintained during 2009, seems to assure 
that no such measure would be brought to a vote in that chamber, either.
 Regardless of what the Court of Appeals or the legislature might do, the reality 
is that with marriage being available in neighboring jurisdictions, same-sex couples 
residing in New York have married elsewhere and more such couples will continue to 
marry elsewhere and return to New York to live as marital partners. The right to 
recognition of those marriages is rapidly becoming established at law, if perhaps not 
yet fully in public opinion. This stalemate in the movement toward same-sex marriage 
in New York exposes the state government to legitimate criticism for hypocrisy, and 
to ridicule for a feckless inability to meet the actual situation on the ground with 
suitable legislation. But any long-time observer of New York State politics is likely to 
react to this situation with a resigned shrug of the shoulders accompanied by the 
question, “So what else is new?”
 Of course, if the legislature were to resolve its stalemate and pass the marriage 
bill, this essay would attain the welcome status of quaint history.
